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Panagariya  studies  the case for three different  across  different  countries  in the region,  and the
approaches  to regionalism  in East Asia.  possibility  of retaliation  from the United  States
through  increased  protection  against East Asian
First,  he examines  closely the only serious  goods.
attempt  at preferential  trading  in the region  -
the Association  of Southeast  Asian  Nations  Third,  he examines  the cage for siunlta-
(ASEAN),  which has recently  announced  plans  neous,  most favored  nation-styie,  nondiscrimina-
to form the ASEAN  Free Trade Area (AFTA).  tory regionwide  liberalizatiot:.  Panagariya  argues
Conclusion:  the costs of such subregional  that that although  such a regional  approach
schemes  far outweigh  their expected  benefits.  "may"  be feasible,  the case for it is far from
airtight.  On the one hand, this approach  will face
Second,  he evaluates  the case for a formal  less resistance  from the United  States,  and is
East Asian  trading  bloc along the lines  of the  likely to promote  an open world trading  system
European  Community,  and concludes  that  in the long run. On the other hand, in the short
although  the threat  of such a bloc  mnay  serve  run it is likely to be resisted  because  of the
some purpose,  its actual  execution  might  be  adverse  effect on terms  of trade in the  participet-
difficult,  given  the divcrse  levels of protection  ing countries.
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ir to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.








*  I am indebted to Ramgopal Agarwala for many helpful discussions and to Sumana Dhar
for superb research assistance and advance access to her ongoing work on East Asia's
bilateral trade  relationships.  The paper is a part of the Regional Integration Initiative
Study of the  East  Asia Region of the  World Bank and  of RPO  677-86.Apart from occasional  flirtations,  East Asia did not court regionalism  during the decades
following  the Second World War.  The first wave of regionalism,  launched with the founding
of the European Community  in 1957, claimed  large parts of Western Europe, Africa, and Latin
America.  But E1ast  Asia, like North America, remained  virtually untouched  by it.  There was
only orne  regional arrangement--the  Association  of South-East  Asia Nations  (ASEAN)--founded
during this period in the region.  And even this arralgement, despite best intentions, did not
create significant  trade preferences  among its member nations.1
Today, the issue of regionalism  has resurfaced in East Asia.  In spite of th.e  rernarkable
growth stimulated  by global, not regional, outward orientation, regionalism  has reappeared on
the agenda.  The flagging talks at the Uruguay  Round, aggressive  unilateralism  by the United
States, the signinig  of the North American  Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and a continuoous
widening and deepening of the European Community  (EC) are leading some countries in the
region to take another look at the regional alternative.  Thiis  development has manifest itself,
inter alia, in the recent signing of the ASEAN Free 'rade  Area (AFTA).
The world facing East Asia is evolving  rapidly.  There has been an unmistakable  trend
towards regional trading blocs in Europe and North America.  In the EC,  the process cf
consolidation  and expansion  of the common market has been moving ahead at a ste-ady  pace.
Though tariff barriers have come down under the auspices of tne GATT, nontariff  banriers in
the Community  have  expanded. The coverage  of these barriers  on imports  of manufactures  from
outside countries has risen from lO% in 1966 to 56% in 1986. Intraregional  trade among the
lThere are six members  of ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,  Singapore,
and Thailand. Excluding  Singapore  which  is a free-trading  country, intra-ASEAN  trade accounts
for less than 5% of the countries' trade.  Of this, less than 5% ic subject to any kind of trade
preferences.EC-12 has expanded from 6% of the CDP in i960 to 13.8% in 1990. At the same time, trade
with the rest of the world has remained  unchanged  at 8.7% of the GDP in the case of exports.
Most recently, the  "Europe 1992" movement for a  "Single European Market'  has had the
undesirable  side effect of promoting the "fortress" ;nentality  in the region.  This was illustraLed
graphically  by the recent remark made by the EC Commissioner  for Foreign  Relations  Willy de
Clerq, "We are not building a single market in order to tumn  it over to hungry foreigners." 2
In the Americas, the United States' conmitment to the GATT process has weakened.
At the same time, other countries in the region have lost confidence  in the GATT's ability to
maintain  an open world trading system. The result has been an upsurge of interest in regional
arrangements  leading to the Canada-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement  and the signing  of the NAFTA
among Canada, Mexico and the United States.  The Bush administration  even launched the
Enterprise  of Americas  Initiative  under which  the United  States  may negotiate  FTAs with groups
of Latin American countries.  Latin American countries are, in turn, eager to enter regional
pacts with the United States to secure future market access for  their exports.  In the medium
to long run, a Western Hemispheric  FTA cannot be ruled out.
Yet another disturbing development from the viewpoint of East Asia is the rise of
"aggressive  unilateralism"  in the United  States. Large and persistent  current account  deficits  and
a  steady decline in  the U.S.  competitiveness  in  manufacturing have led  to  an increasing
acceptance of the view in the U.S. that a partial solution to America's trade problems lies in
threatening Japan  with increased tarriers  to  its exports to  United States unless it  meets
prespecified targets for imports from the latter.
2See Winters (1993).
2An inescapable  implication  of these developments  is that East Asia must begin to devise
strategies which will permit it to  maintain a high level of growth in the region.  Should
regionalism  be a part of this strategy? If yes, in what form7 If not why not?  These are the
cenual questions addressed in the present paper.  I evaluate both the dar-ers  and promises of
regionalism for East Asia.
In Section 1, I provide aiu overview  of East Asia with special emphasis  on the region's
trade flows. In Section  2, I discuss the main messages  of the old and new literature on regional
integration.  In Section 3, the case for regional integration in East Asia is considered. Cases
for three possible forms of integration are  evaluated:  sub-regional groupings such as  the
ASEAN, an East Asian trading bloc, and region-wide  nondiscriminatory  liberalization. .1  argue
that the first of these is undesirable, the second is infeasible, and the third holds some promise
though the case for it is far from clear cut.  In Section 4, brief concluding  remarks are offered.
31.  East Asia:  An Overview 3
In this  ,ction,  I summarize  East Asia's position in the global context and offer a broad
look at major players in the region.  My obiective  is to create a simple but clear picture which
the reader can carry in his mind while reading the rest of the paper.  For the more devoted
reader, detailed  and precise information  is provided in a series of tables at the end of the paper.
Because  I plan to liraiit  myself  to regional  integration  in trade, the discussion  is focused  primarily
on regional trade flows. In East Asia, investment  flows  are an important  part of the integration
story but, mindful of my comparative  disadvantage,  I leave this topic for other authors.
1.1  East Asia in the Global Context
During 1980s, growth rates in all major countries in the region, except Philippines,
exceeded the growth rate in industrial market economies  by at least 1% and as much as 6.6%
(Table 1).  Outside the region, India was the only country which grew at rates comparable  to
those experienced  by some of the countries  in the region. East Asia's share in the world's GDP,
expoits and imports has grown steadily  while its share in population  has declined slightly over
the decade (Table 2).  In 1990, the region accounted  fo. slightly  less than one fifth of both the
world GDP and world trade and one third of the world population.
There have been three main changes in the distribution  of East Asia's exports across
major regions of the world during 1980-90. First, the share of less developed  countries has
declined by half.  Second, North America's share increased sharply during the first half of the
3In this paper,  the  terrl  East Asia is  defined loosely to  refer  to  Japan,  the Newly
Industrialized Economies ( .IEs) vHorg Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), ASEAN 4
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines  and Thailand),  and China.  Other countries such as Brunei,
Cambodia, North Korea a!  Vietnam *re  obviously  a part of the East Asia region. But they  do
not appear explicitly in our analysis.
4decade but declined, though  less sharply, in the second half. Third, as with North America  and
Western Europe, intra-regional  trade has grown prorortionately over the years.
In 1980, East Asia exportc  J 30% of its gces  to itself, 26% to North America, 19% to
Europe, and 18% to Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia (Table 3).  In 1985,
the region's exports to North America rose to 38% and those to itself fell to 25%.  Between
1985 and 1990, there was a rapid shift in East Asia's exports away from other partners to itself.
By 1990, the region was the largest recipient  of its own goo's.  It exported  approximately  32  %
of the goods to itself, 32  % to North America  and 21 % to Europe. The combined  share of Latin
America, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia fell to a mere 8%.
1.2  Major  Players in the Region
In economic terms, there are ten major players in East Asia:  the ASEAN 4 consisting
of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,  and Thailand; the Newly Industrialized  Economies  (NIEs)
comprising Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (China); and China and
Japan.  F  'veral features of the countries are worth noting.
(i) Per-Capita  Incomes. Growth. ad  Centrality  of Japan. The countries  in the region are
at very different levels of development. With a per-capita income of $23,800 in 1990, Japan
is the richest country in the region (table 2).  Per-capita incomes in the rema±ing countries
range from a low $327 in China to $11 700 in Singapore. 4 ASEAN 4 enjoy significantly  lower
per-capita incomes than the NIEs.  Within ASEAN 4, Malaysia and Thailand are richer than
4Per-capita  incomes  change  dramatically  if they are calculated  at the purchasin- power  parity
(PPP) rather than the nominal exchange  rate.  According  to the recent IMF calculations,  they
rise almost by a factor of four in the case of China. In the case of Japan, they fall by a factor
of 0.7.
5Indonesia and Philippines.  Within NIEs, Singapore  ara  Hong Kong enjoy higher per-capita
incomes than Korea and Taiwan (China).
Economically,  Japan is by far the largest nation in the region.  Its share in the world
GDP for the year 1990 was 13.5%.  'Within  East Asia, it ac-.rmted for approximately  70% of
the region's GDP.  If we exclude Japan, East Asia's share in the world GDP drops from one
fifth to one twentieth.  The picture changes, however, if we use GDP aigures based on the
purchasing  power parity (PPP) instead of those  in Table 2 which  are based  on nominal  exchange
rate.  Thus, according to the  zent,  PPP-based IMF figures, China comes close to Japan in
terms of size.  According to these figures, for the year 1990, China's share in the world GDP
is 6% compared  with Japan's 7.6% and Germany's  4.3%.  Ar the current rate of growth, China
will soon overtake Japan.  In terms of population, China accounts for 70% of the region's
population. If we exclude it, East Asia's share in the world population  declines from one third
to less than one tenth.
The remaining economies  in the region are small.  Indeed, based oti data in Table 2,
with the exception of China, the republic of Korea, and Taiwan (China), individual  shares of
the remaining  6 countries  in the world GDP are less than  0.50%.  The combined  share of China,
the Republic  of Korea, and Taiwan (China)  is less than 3%.
Real incomes have  grown rapi1ly  in East Asia  during the past three decades. In the three
NIEs for which information  is available--Hong  Kong, Korea and Singapore--real  growth rates
have ranged from 6% to 10% in each of the three decades between 1960 and 1990 (Table 1).
More broadly, with  just three exceptions--Indonesia  in the 1960s, and Japan and the Philippines
in the 1980s--all  ten economies  in the region have grown at real rates exceeding  5% per annum
6during each of the past three decades.  No economy  outside  East Asia has been able to perform
this teat.  The best examples  outside East Asia are Blrazil  and Mexico. Each of these countries
grew at real rates exceeding 5% during 1960s  and 70s but did extremely poorly during 1980s:
Brazil grew at a rate of 2.7% and Mexico 1%.
(ii) Importance  of Trade.  Trade has been the undisputed  engine of gi ,wth for virtually
all e-onomies in the region except perhaps Japan. 5 Expert performance of the NIEs is well
do;ar  ranted.  Korea's export growth has been in the double digits during each of the past three
decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, its exports grew at the phenomenal  rates of 34% and 23%,
respectively.  In the 1980s when world trade grew far less rapidly than in the previous two
decades,  exports of China, Korea, Malaysia,  Taiwan  (China)  and Thailand  still managed  to grow
at rates exceeding 10%.
Though trade regimes in East Asia can be characterized  as generally open, there is a
substantial variation in the level of protection across countries.  Openness of Japan's trade
regime has been a  matter of great deal of controversy in recent years.  In terms of formal
barrierF, Japan's trade regime is as open as those of other developed countries.  There are
virtually no quantitative  restrictions  in the country and tariff rates are low (see Table 11). Yet,
the import-to-GDP  ratio of the country is lower than that of other countries  of similar size and
income. This is viewed  by some  as Fl  ima facie evidence  that the country's markets are de facto
closed.
5There is general agreement that Japan has relied on the infant-industry  protection  in some
cases.  Its relatively low exports-to-GDP  ratio at 12% in 1980, 13% in 1985 and 10% in 1990
suggests that the momentum  for growth must come predominantly  from internal markets.
7Amnong  the remaining East Asian countries, ;Iong Koi.g and 'ingapore are textbook
examples of free trading economies. For five out of the remdining  seven countries--Korea  and
ASEAN  4--Table  4 provides  the relevan,.  in!ormz 1tion. The most remarkable  point to note is that
quantitative  restrictions in Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, ano Thailand have been scaled down
dramatically  during 1980s  with the result that they  apnear almost extinct for the latest year for
which information  is available. Tariff -ates have also been reduced in these countries but they
are still high, especially  in Thailand. IndLlesia has high levels of tariff as uell as quantitative
restrictions.  Effective rates of protection for manufacturing  in Indonesia and Thailand exceed
50%.  China is also among the more protected  economies  of the region.  The unweighted  and
trade-weighted mean tariif rates in China were 43% and 32%, respectively, in  1992.  The
coverage of administrative  import regulation  extends to more than 50% of the imports.  But
because China's import-GDP ratio has been rising rapidly  and tariff revenue as a percentage of
the c.i.f. value of imports is very low (5.6% in 1991),  it has been suggested  that China's regime
is de facto much more open than is suggested  by ihs formal barriers. 6
Purely in terms of trade-to-GDP  ratios, the smaller econornie!,  of the region are very
open.  As shown in the last two columns of Table 2, except in the case of China and Japan,
exports and imports as a percentage  of GDP are high.  In 1990, these ratios were in excess of
100 for Hong Kong and Singapore. For ASEAN as a group, each of these ratios is bigger than
30%.  For the NIES, the ratios are almost 40%.
6We do not have information  on Taiwan but its trade regime is known  to be generally  open.
8(iii) Direction of Exports and Imports.  Tables 5-8 show the airection of exports and
imports of  the  countries for years  1980, 1985, 1990 and  1991.7  Beyond some special
relationships  to be noted below, the center of gravity of intra-regional  trade is Japan.  In 1990,
virtually all countries except Hoatg  Kon' and Singapore  exported more than tO%  of their gzoods
to Japan.8 The proportion of cxports of the countries going to ASEAN-4 was quite sinall.
With the exception of Singapore  which has a special relationship  with Malaysia, these exports
ranged from 2.4% for Indoiiesia  to 7.7% for Japan.  Exports going to China, potentially  the
second-largest  market im  the region after Japan, were also small.
There are two noteworthy  subregional  trade relatiouiships  within  East Asia. First, China
channels  a substantial  part of its exports to the United States and EC through Hong Kong.  In
199C,  China sold 43% of its exports to Hong Kong of which approximately  32:%  were re-
exported.  China's imnports  from Hong Kong are also large and amounted to 26.5% of its total
imports in 1990. Taiwaa exported 13% of its goods to Hong Kong. The high intensity  of trade
among China, Hong Kong and Taiwan is reflective of the special, albeit market driven, trade
and investment relationships  in the sub-region.  Second, in  1990, Malaysia sold 23% of its
exports to and bought 15% of is- imports from Singapore. Indonesia  sold 7% of its exports to
71n Tables 5-8, we .eport the export and import shares for years 1980, 1985, and 1990 as
derived from the U.N. Comtrade data and for years 1990 and 1991 as derived from the IMF
Direction of Trade (DOT) data . A comparison  of shares  obtained  from the two sources  for the
year 1990 shows  that the two sets of numbers  are approximately  consistent  with each other. The
main exceptions may seem to be China in the case of exports and Hong Kong in the case of
imports. But this is simply  because  the DOT data have  been corrected for re-exports  of Chinese
goods by Hong Kong.
8Though  the latest year for which Tables  5-8 provide informatior.  is 1991, in the text I rely
on the 1990 U.N. Comtrade data.  This is because the other latest trade data discussed  in the
paper are for that year and from the U.N. Comtrade  data bases.
9and bought 6% of its imports from Singapore.  These flows are related largely to the SIJORI
Growth Triangle relationship. 9
Because of these special relationships,  exports of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore
are  more concentrated i.  East Asia than of  other countries.  China's  exports are  also
concentrated  in East Asia though not as much after we correct for re-exports from Hong Kong.
.n 1990, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore,  respectively  exported  51.5%, 57% and 45% of
their goods to East Asia.  At 66%, the share of Indonesia's exports going to East Asia was also
large but this was because of the large proportion  of its exports going to Japan.
On the import side, the proportion of goods coming from within East Asia is large for
virtually all countries.  This is either due to a large proportion of imports coming from Japan
or special trade relationships. In 1990, the proportion  exceeded  40% for all countries except
Japan and the Republic  of Korea (Table 7 and 8).  For 5 out of the 10 countries--China,  Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore  and Thailand--the  proportion was in excess of 50%.
2.  The Economics  of Discriminatory Liberalization 0
The term regional  integration  has been used traditionally  to refer to discriminatory  trade
liberalization  whereby two or more countries  lower trade barriers against one another relative
9SUORI  consists of Singapore,  Johor, and Riau.  The latter two are provinces  of Malaysia
and Indonesia, respectively. Though  there is no trilateral  agreement  of any kind among the three
governments, there are two formal documents signed by the governments of Indonesia and
Singapore.  These outline Singapore's role in  the development of  the Riau province and
Indonesia's promise to supply water to and guarantee investments  from Singapore. For more
details, see Chia and Lee (1992).
10Somc  of the points made in this section can be found in Melo and Panagariya (1992)
which, in turn, is based on Melo and Panagariya  (1993).
10to the rest of the world. Because  such liberalization  makes  the participating  countries  more open
to each other but possibly less open to outside countries, its effects on economic  efficiency  are
ambiguous  in general. This fact has made regional integration  a highly contentious  issue.
In this section, I summarize  the broad implications  of discriminatory  liberalization  by a
pair of countries.  The analysis is essentially applicable to  more than two countries.  The
discussion begins with an exposition of the influential concepts of trade creation and trade
diversion introduced  by Viner (1950) in his classic work The Customs Union Issue.  This is
followed by a comparison between a free trade area and nondiscriminatory,  unilateral trade
liberalization.  The section is  concluded with a discussion of why countries find regional
integration an attractive  option today.
2.1  Trade Creation and Trade D1version
Let us begin with the standard, static  analysis of a free trade area (FTA) which involves
a  removal of  trade restrictions by partner countries without adopting a common external
tariff.11 Imagine that starting from a nondiscriminatory  tariff, Japan and Indonesia form an
FTA.  For simplicity, focus on the market for VCRs.  Assume that VCRs are a homogeneous
good and that Indonesia  is a net importer of them.  At $200 per VCR, Korea is the cheapest
llIt may be noted that the Vinerian  analysis  does not focus on the transitiQn  from pre-FTA
to post-FTA equilibrium.  Instead, it compares the two equilibria after resources have been
reallocated in response to the formation of the FTA.  This means that adjustment costs and
temporary unemployment associated with  the  movement from the  pre-FTA to  post-FEA
equilibrium  are not incorporated  into the analysis.
11supplier of the product in the world.12 Japan supplies  the product at a per-unit price of $220.
Unit costs and, hence, the selling prices of Korea and Japan are constant.
Assume  that initially  Indonesia  imposes  a 50% tariff on all imported VCRs. This makes
the tariff-inclusive  price of VCRs from Korea $300 and those from Japan $330.  All imports
come from Korea and the price of VCRs in Indonesia  settles  at $300. At this price, suppose  that
Indonesians  buy a total of 150,000 VCRs.  Of these, Indonesian  sellers, who produce VCRs at
increasing marginal costs, supply 100,000.  The remaining 50,000 units come from Korea.
Indonesia  collects $5,000,000 in import duties.
Now suppose that Indonesia  forms a free trade area with Japan. The two countries  drop
tariffs on each other but retain them on outside  countries including  Korea.  Because  there is no
tariff on Japanese VCRs any longer, these latter can be sold in Indonesia  at $220 while Korean
VCRs are priced at $300. All imported VCRs now come from Japan and the price of VCRs in
Indonesia declines to $220.  From an efficiency standpoint, assuming for now a fixed total
demand of 150,000 VCRs in Indcnesia, two effects can be identified.
First, the original imports of 50,000 VCRs which came from the lowest-cost supplier,
Korea, now come from the higher-cost partner, Japan.  In Vinerian terms,  this is  "trade
diversion"  and is associated  with a loss for Indonesia. The loss is manifest  in the disappearance
of tariff revenue which is recaptured only partially by consumers  in the form of a lower price
of VCRs.  The remainder of tariff revenue goes to pay for less efficiently  produced  VCRs of
the partner country.  Second, because VCRs are produced  under increasing  marginal costs in
12Note that we deliberately  assume that Japan is not the cheapest source of VCRs.  If it
were, a free trade area in VCRs will be vacuous  in that, given constant costs, the outcome will
be unaffected  by whether liberalization  is preferential or nondiscriminatory.
12Indonesia,  the output there declines  with the decline  in price. VCRs p'roduced  at a marginal  cost
higher than $220 in Indonesia  are replaced  by cheaper  imports. This "trade creation" improves
efficiency  by replacing  higher-cost  Indonesian  production by lower-cost  Japanese imports.  13
Trade diversion reduces efficiency  while trade creation improves it.  Therefore, the net
effect of an FTA is ambiguous  in general.  Ceteris paribus, the higher tlv initial tariff, the
lower the difference  between  the prices of the two suppliers  of imports,  and the larger the
economic  size of the union, the more likely that the FTA will improve efficiency.  A high
initial tariff means that the potential gains from deprotecting  the domestic industry even on a
discriminatory  basis are large or, equivalently, the trade creation effect is likely to dominate.
A small difference  between the prices of the partner and the outside source means that the terms
of trade deterioration  from switching  to the partner is small or, equivalently,  the trade diversion
effect is small.  Finally, the larger the union, the more likely that the lowest-cost source of
supply will be within the union.  For instance, in our example, if Korea was also included in
the  union,  there  will be  no  trade  diversion in  the  VCR  market and  welfare will rise
unambiguously.
As an anchor for future discussion, it is useful to summarize this analysis graphically.
In Figure 1, DD' and SS', respectively,  represent  Indonesia's demand for and supply of VCRs
of a given quality.  The vertical axis shows the price of an VCR in U.S.  dollars and the
13Observe that as noted before, resources released from VCR industry in Indonesia are
assumed to be reallocated  to other sectors which are more productive.  In the transition, there
is likely to be unemployment. Moreover, reallocation  of resources may involve training and
other adjustment  costs.  These costs are not incorporated  into the analysis in the text.  If we
could measure these  costs satisfactorily,  however,  the analysis  can be modified  to take them into
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40  100  150  200  1000  VCRshorizontal  axis the quantity in thousand  VCRs.  Under a nondiscriminatory  tariff of 50%,  the
price in Indonesia is $300 and quantities consumed, produced and imported are  150,000,
100,000, and 50,000, respectively. All imports come from Korea at a border price of $200.
Inport duties sum to areas I plus 2.
An FTA between  Indonesia  and  Japan lowers  the price in Indonesia  to $220 per VCR  and
all imports now come from Japan.  Of the original 150,000 VCRs bouglit earlier, 40,000 are
now produced  domestically  and 110,000  imported from Japan.  The 60,000 additional  imported
units replace higher-cost  domestic units.  This is trade creation and yields a gain of area 3 for
Indonesia.  The other 50,000 units replace cheaper Korean units.  This is trade diversion and
leads to a loss of area 1 for Indonesia. 14
There is one more source of efficiency  effect which, in the spirit of Viner, we have not
identified so  far.15 The reduction in  price  from  S300  to  $220 per  VCR  expands the
consumption  of VCRs and brings the marginal  benefit from consumption  closer to the marginal
cost of it.  This generates a further welfare gain represented by area 4.  The net effect of the
FTA is positive or negative as the sum of areas 3 and 4 is larger or smaller than area 1.
2.2  A Puzzle:  Why form an FTA when Nondiscriminatory, Unilateral Liberalization is
Superior?
In the small-country  context we have chosen in the previous subsection,  it is easy to see
that Indonesia  can improve its welfare unambiguously  relative to the initial as well as the post-
140bserve that all of tariff revenue represented  by areas 1 and 2 disappears. But area 1 is
recaptured by consumers  via a lower price of VCRs.
1sViner implicitly assumed a completely inelastic demand.  This practice is surprisingly
common in policy analyses which often ignore the changes in demand.
14FTA equilibrium  by liberalizing trade unilaterally  on a nondiscriminatory  basis.  For example,
if Indonesia  lowers its tariff on both Japan and Korea to 10%, Korea continues  to outcompete
Japan. The tariff inclusive  price of Korean VCRs is now $220; we obtain the same  equilibrium
as under FTA but without any trade diversion.  Indonesia is able to  collect import duties
represented by areas 1, 5, and 6 in addition to the efficiency  gains represented  by areas 3 and
4 in Figure 1; the country gains relative to the initial as well as FTA equilibrium.
The proposition  that unilateral, nondiscriminatory  liberalization  is superior to an FPA is
robust to a variety of modifications  provided we continue  to make the "small  union' assumption
(i.e., the countries forming  the union  are too small to influence  the terms of trade in the outside
world).  Three such modifications  may be mentioned.  First, in the Indonesia-Japan  example
above, suppose we introduce increasing marginal costs of production in Japan.  In this case,
Indonesia  is likely to import VCRs from both Japan and Korea before as well as after the FTA.
This will not change our conclusion, however. Indonesia's welfare under a nondiscriminatory
liberalization  will remain unambiguously  higher than under an FTA.
Second, suppose  we now recognize  the fact that as a part of the FTA, Japan also lowers
its tariffs on Indonesian goods.  This will surely create benefits for Indonesia  which are not
available through unilateral liberalization. While this is true, we also know from our earlier
analysis that  the  gains to  Japan from lowering its  tariff are  higher if  it  does so  on  a
nondiscriminatory basis.  Indeed, it can be  .hown that the extra gains to  Indonesia from
preferential  liberalization by  Japan  are  less  than  the  extra  benefits to  Japan  from  a
nondiscriminatory  liberalization. Put differently, though one country can enjoy a higher real
income under an FTA than under a nondiscriminatory  liberalization,  the combined income of
15the partners will be lower under the former scenario.  The country benefitting more from an
FTA than nondiscriminatory  liberalization  canmiot  afford to bribe the other country into forming
an FTA.
Third, suppose  there are scale economies. Here again, as long as we maintain  the small
union assumption, nondiscriminatory  liberalization  dominates.  The simple point is that with
declining  costs, if it is at all profitable  for the country  to produce the good subject  to economies
of scale, it should expand production  all the way to the minimuni  rost Doint,  consume what it
can consume domestically, and export the residual to the outside world.  To exploit scale
economies, one does not need a "partner country's" market when the world market is there.
2.3  The Attraction of Regionalism:  Some Answers
In spite of this dominance of unilateral, nondiscriminatory  liberalization, how do we
explain the attraction of regionalism  today? For this, we must look beyond the standard small-
country, small-union  model.  A number of modifications  can be considered.
First,  the small union assumption may not be valid.  Thus, in our Japan-Indonesia
example, the price at which Korea sells VCRs to Indonesia  may  depend on the number  of VCRs
sold.  In response to a switch  in demand from Korea to Japan due to preferential  liberalization,
Korea may lower its price to remain competitive  in the Indonesian  market. Ihe terms of trade
for Indonesia  improve. Likewise, the price paid by Japan to extra-union  suppliers  may decline
in response  to the preferential  access offered by it to Indonesia. This improvement  in the terms
of trade yields benefits not available  through nondiscriminatory,  unilateral liberalization.
Second, there is the closely related issue of access to the world markets.  In a world
infested with voluntary  export restraints, administered  protection, and a strong tendency  for the
16formation of  trading blocs,  the  difference between discriminatory and  nondiscriminatory
liberalization  may be blurred.  In the limit, we can imagine an outside world which does not
trade externally at all.  Then trade restrictions  on the outside  world are ¶ acuous and it does not
matter whether liberalization  is discriminatory  or nondiscriminatory. What is important is that
liberalization  be undertaken  on a region wide basis and for this regional  integration may be a
powerful instrument.  By bringing countries together to liberalize  simultaneously,  the regional
approach  can help solve  the same prisoners' dilemma  at the regional level that the GATI helps
solve at the multilateral  level.
Third, once we admit the limits on access to the world market, large gains from regional
integration  are possible  if scale economies  are present. Mutual  liberalization  by countries  in the
region will then provide room for expanded scale of  operation, specialization, and plant
rationalization. Regional  opening may also offer gains from increased  product variety.
Fourth, for smaller economies of the region, a regional arrangement with Japan can
guarantee  future access to a large, developed-country  market. Under normal  circumstances,  this
may not be important but in the event the EC and Americas continue  to travel down the road
leading to inward-looking  blocs, such access may be crucial. From the viewpoint  of entire East
Asia, the threat of a regional arrangement may also serve to deter the EC and Americas from
turning more inward.
Fifth, even when the rest of the world is open, there may be goods which are tradable
only regionally. For these goods, a simultaneous  liberalization  through  a regional approach  can
bestow gains for the same reasons as multilateral trade liberalization.  Trade in  electricity
between neighboring countries is one such example.  Under a broad interpretation, we can
17include cooperation on projects of regional interest--development  of roads, dams, and water
resources--in  this category. A concrete  example is the recent agreement,  signed in 1991, under
which  Singapore  will cooperate  with Indonesia  to develop  water resources  in the latter's province
of Riau in return for guaranteed water supply for 50 years.
Sixth, unilateral  liberalization,  even if superior  to the regional  route in principle, may be
politically infeasible.  At political levels, there is a  strong mercantilist  bias in  trade-policy
thinking. Any reduction in trade barriers is viewed  as a concession  given to foreigners. Under
this mind set, unilateral  import liberalization  is a free gift to the world while liberalization  via
the regional route brings concessions  from partners.  In practice, This factor seems to become
particularly important when the level of protection  is not wildly high.  Mexico and Chile have
been able to .iberalize imports unilaterally to a considerable  degree but further liberalization
seems to require a regional  context. In East Asia, countries  such as Malaysia, Thailand,  Korea
and Philippines  have also been successful  in unilateral liberalization  up to a degree but may
require a regional context for further import liberalization.
Seventh, regional  integration  can go far beyond trade liberalization. In East Asia, intra-
regional labor mobility, direct foreign investment, and financial-capital  flows will play an
increasingly important role in  the forthcoming years.  To the extent that harmonization of
policies  across countries  can help facilitate  such movements,  regional  integration  can offer gains
not available through either unilateral or global actions. 16
1 6Melo, Panagariya,  and Rodrik (1993)  develop  a formal  model  in which  regional  integration
leads to "trade" in institutions  between partner countries. Among other things, they show that
this type of integration may serve to dilute the power of lobbies and help create superior
institutions.
18Finally,  regional integration may be  an instrument of  promoting harmony among
participating  countries.  The most dramatic example of this is the EC which has united two
former enemies--France  and Germany--in  such  a tight economic  union  that another war between
them is unthinkable. In East Asia also, a regional  arrangement  can help reduce  political  tensions
and promote political harmony among former enemies (e.g.,  China and Japan: China and
Taiwan; Republic  of Korea and Japan; and North Korea and the Republic of Korea).
3.  Should East Asia Go Regional?
Having considered the possible costs and benefits of regionalism, we are  now in a
position to confront directly the central question of this paper:  Should East Asia go regional?
I will argue presently that in spite of the many possible  gains just listed, both economics  and
politics appear against a discriminatory bloc in East Asia.  Historically, as summarized in
Section 1, East Asia has benefitted greatly from an open world trading system.  The region's
future interests will continue  to be served best by a strategy which  ensure an open world trading
system.
Does this mean that regionalism  has no place in East Asia?  Not necessarily. For the
unique circumstances  of East Asia, a regional approach which is nondiscriminatory  may still
hold some promise.  The success of  this approach is predicated upon the extent of trade
expansion in Japan in the years to come.  If a substantial  expansion  takes place, simultaneous
trade liberalization  by other major players in the region such as China, Republic of Korea,
Thailand and  Indonesia can become instruments of  containing unilateralism and lobbying
pressures in the United States and breathe a new life into the multilateral  trade negotiations.
19In thc following, I evaluate the role of regionalism  at three levels.  First, I examine
closely the  only  serious attempts at  preferential trading, the  ASEAN which has recently
announced  plans to form the ASEAN  Free Trade Area (AFTA). I suggest  that the costs of such
sub-regional schemes far outweigh their expected benefits.  Second, I evaluate the case for a
formal East Asian bloc along the lines of the EC or North America and conclude that though
the threat of  such a  bloc may serve some purpose, its actual execution is a  highly risky
proposition.  Finally, I evaluate the case for simultaneous,  MFN style, nondiscriminatory
liberalization  on a region-wide  basis.  I argue that a case for such a regional approach "may"
exist, though it is far from airtight.
3.1  Sub-Regional  Groupings: ASEAN  and AFIA
I divide the discussion in this sub-section into three parts.  Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2
desgribe  the evolution  of ASEAN in trade area and plans for the AFTA, respectively. Section
3.1.3 evaluates  the case for promoting formal regional integration in the sub-region.
3.1.1  ASEAN: The Disappointing  Past 17
Major developments  in ASEAN  are associated  with four Summits  attended  by the heads
of states of the member  nations. The First Summit,  held in August 1967, created the association
through the ASEAN Declaration.  The Second Summit produced the ASEAN Concord of
February 24, 1976 which  paved the way for economic  cooperation  among member  nations. The
Third Summit  attempted  to strengthen  the cooperation  through  Manila Declaration  of December
15, 1987. Finally, the Fourth Summit  concluded  with the Singapore  Declaration  of January  28,
17For details on ASEAN until 1987, see Sopiee, See and Jin (1987).  For more recent
developments,  see Pangestu, Soesastro  and Ahrned (1992)  and Ariff and Chye (1992).  In the
following, I draw freely on Pangestu et al.
201992 which announced  plans for an ASEAN Free Trade  Area (AFTA).  In-between,  numerous
ministerial  meetings have taken place to give shape to the broad intentions in the declarations
signed at the summits.
Ateas of  economic cooperation in ASEAN are  wide ranging.  They include trade,
industry, energy,  tourism, forestry, minerals, food and agriculture, and finance.  In  the
following,  I will focus primarily  on three programs which  fall in areas of trade and industry  and
are designed to promote preferential trade and investment within the region:  (i) Preferential
Trading Arranger.  ents (PITA)  introduced  in 1977;  (ii) ASEAN  Industrial  Joint Ventures  (AIJVS);
and (iii) ASEAN Industrial Complementation  (AIC) schemes.
(i! Preferential  Trading Arrangements  (PTA). The PTA piovides for tariff preferences,
referred to as the margin of preference, for intra-ASEAN  tra0e. 18 Till the announcement  of
AFTA, the rules of origin required that the ASEAN content of a product be 50% or more to
qualify for tariff preference.  On a case by case basis, this limit could be reduced to 35%.
Initially, items for tariff preferences were negotiated  on a product by product basis.  In 1980,
an across the board minimum  margin  of preference was introduced  for imports above a certain
value but, because  countries were allowed to have exclusion  lists, the provision  had little effect.
In 1987, preferences actually  granted under the PTA were minimal. Based  on the 50%
(or 35% if agreeable) ASEAN content requirement, there were 12,783 items on the PTA list.
Out of these eligible items, only 337 or 2.6% items were actually granted tariff preferences.
18The  PTA was introduced  initially  thorough  the Agreement  on ASEAN  Preferential  Trading
Arrangements (APITA)  signed in Manila on February 24, 1977 and strengthened  later in the
Protocol on Improvements  on Extension of Tariff Preferences under the ASEAN Preferential
Trading Arrangements, signed in Manila on December  15, 1987.
21Furthermore, only 19% of the total value of imports of these items enjoyed the preferential
tariff.  table 9 provides detail, on individual  countries.
At  the  Manila Summ:t in  1987, t;,e member countries adopted changes aimed at
strengthening  tariff preferences.  Th: countries agreed to shorten the exclusion  list to 10% of
the eligible  items on the PTA  list by 1992  (1994 in the case  of Indonesia  and Philippines). They
agreed to reduce the value of imports  on the ,xclusion list to 50% or less of intra-ASEAN  trade
by the same date.  There was also an agreement to freeze the level of nontariff  barriers and to
negotiate  reductions in them.
Systematic  data on the progress towards  achiev; 7 these  goals is not available. But from
what is available, progress appears  to have  been  less thin sparkling. Table 10 shows  Indonesia's
total exports to and imports from ASEAN  as well as those  enjoying  tariff preferences  under PTA
for years 1987 to 1989.  The share of Indonesia's exports to ASEAN which benefitted from
tariff preferences rose from a 1.4% in 1987 to 3.5% in 1989. Similarly, Indonesia's imports
entering under preferential tariffs as  a proportion of its total imports from other ASEAN
countries rose from 1.2% in 1987 to 1.6% in 1989.
(ii)  ASEAN Industrial  Joint Ventures. Introduced  in 1983, the AUIV  program is aimed
at promoting intra-ASEAN  investment  among  private investors. The main incentive  is a tariff
preference.  The countries participating  in an AIJV project charge only 10% of their prevailing
tariff (i.e., give a 90% margin of preference) on goods produced by and imported from the
latter.  There have to be at least two ASEAN countries participating in the project.  Foreign
participation  in equity is allowed but ASEAN  participants  must own at least 40% of the equity.
22To receive the taJ:f preference, the product must be first included in the list of AUV
products.  The process of getting  a new product included  in the list is cumbersome. To-date,
only 26 products have been  granted the AUJV  status. These include automotive  components  and
parts, mechanical  power rack and steering systems,  chemicals, enamel, food products, etc.
It is not clear how much exra  investment  has been generated  by this scheme. There is
only one AUV having  equity participation  by all ASEAN countries. Most AUVs have foreign
equity participation.  Projects under the  scheme are concentrated largely in  Malaysia and
Thailand. In some cases, AUJVs  have experienced  difficulties  in getting tariff preferences from
participating  countries.  Sometimes,  participating  countries want a quid pro 1 quo under which
they ask the project to import goods from them.
(iii)  ASEAN Industrial Complerentation (AIC) Scheme.  The AIC scheme was
introduced in  1981 with the objective of dividing different production stages of an industry
among ASEAN countries.  The idea was to avoid duplication  and take advantage of scale
economies. The first AIC scheme, involving  a'4tomotive  parts and components,  was a failure
due to differences  in brands and types  of vehicles  among the ASEAN countries. Intra-ASEAN
trade under the scheme remained  minimal.
Recognizing the brand incompatibility  problem in the first scheme, The second AIC
scheme was based on Brand to Brand Complementation  (BBC)  in the automotive  sector.  The
scheme lets the private sector determine the division of production across member countries.
Products of the BBC firms automatically  receive a 50% tariff preference provided they satisfy
the PTA's rules of origin.  In 1991, the BBC was extended to non-automotive  products.
23Brunei, Indonesia and Singapore chose to stay out of the BBC scheme.  Brunei and
Singapore do not have an automotive industry while Indonesia wanted to  protect its own
automotive  industry. To-date  progress under the BBC scheme  has consisted  of approval  of eight
packages involving Mitsubishi, Volvo, Mercedes Benz, Nissan, Toyota, DAF group from
Belgium, and Renault.
3.1.2  AFI'A: Thne for Serious Business?
Negotiations  for the NAFTA and for a Single  European  Market  in early 1990s  swung  the
ASEAN members into action.  At the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore, on January 28,
1992, the member nations signed a framework agreement to establish and participate in the
ASEAN Free Trade Area within 15 years, i.e.,  by the year 2007.  Though the 'framework"
agreement is less binding than a treaty, member  nations expect it to serve as an instrument  of
speeding up the integration process in the region.
The key vehicle for implementation  of the AFTA is the Common  Effective Preferential
Tariff (CEPT) which will be applied to goods originating  from ASEAN member States.  The
di.ference between the CEPT and PTA is that the former is slightly more encompassing. The
margin of preference under the PTA is granted only by the nominating  country whereas that
under the CEPT is granted by all members. The ASEAN  content for qualifying  for the CEPT
is 40%, lower than the PTA's 50%.
The  AFTA  covers all  manufactured products,  including capital goods,  processed
agricultural products and those products falling outside the definition  of agricultural products,
in the CEPT scheme.  Products for the CEPT scheme are identified on a HS 6-digit sectoral
level.  Exceptions  at the HS 8/9-digit  level are permitted. The Third AFTA Council, held on
24December 11, 1992, identified  a total of 38,680 items for inclusion  in the CEPT.  These items
represent an average of 88% of  the total tariff lines of the ASEAN member states.  The
coverage ranges from 80% to 98% among the six member countries.  A total of 3,321 items
have been identified  for exclusion  on a temporary  basis. These items are to be reviewed at the
end of eight years.
The Third AFTA Council also drew detailed schedules  of reductions in CEPTs for all
member countries.  The Framework Agreement had identified 15 products as  Fast Track
products for a more speedy liberalization. 19 For these products, tariffs above 20% are to be
reduced to 0-5% by January 1, 2003 while those at or below 20% are to be reduced to 0-5%
by January 1, 2000.  The remaining products are on the Normal Track.  Products in this
category with tariff rates 20% or less are to be reduced to 0-5% by January 2003 while those
with tariff rates above 20%  are to be first reduced to 20% by 2003 and then to 0-5% by 2007.
According to the schedules  drawn by the Third AFTA Council, except Malaysia, no member
plans any tariff reductions in  the first two years of AFTA and even reductions planned by
Malaysia are very small.
The AFTA agreement  also calls for a removal  of quantitative  restrictions  on products as
soon as they are subject to the CEPT.  It also provides for the elimination of other non-tariff
barriers over a period of five years after the product  is brought  under the CEPT. This provision
is stronger thar. the PTA which allowed members  to maintain  their quantitative  restrictions.
19These products include vegetable oils,  cement, chemicals, pharmaceutical, fertilizer,
plastics, rubber products, leather  products, pulp, textiles, cerarnic  and glass products, gems  and
jewellery, copper cathodes, electronics, and wooden  and rattan furniture.
253.1.3  Evaluating  AFTA: A Wrong Turn
The sudden upsurge in FTAs around the world notwithstanding,  on balance, the AFTA
is likely to contribute only marginally to prosperity in the region.  Indeed, the net effect of it
may well be negative.  As a forum for promoting political and cultural harmony and as an
instrument  of encouraging  cooperation  on projects of regional interest, the ASEAN has served
the member  countries  well. But  the preferential  trading  and investment  promoted  by the ASEAN
and planned by the AFTA are likely to be counterproductive. Several points may be noted.
(i) Small Internal Markets.  The case against the AFTA lies primarily in the small size
of the regional market. Because Singapore  already has complete,  nondiscriminatory  free trade,
the AFTA can, by definition, involve  no greater access to its market than what exists currently.
Therefore, the gains from AFTA, if any, must come from integration of the remaining  five
countries' markets. But markets in these countries  are quite small in relation to the world.  As
shown in Table 2, the share of ASEAN 4 (the ASEAN exclusive of Singapore  and Brunei) in
the world GDP has declined  from a low 1.5% in 1980  to 1.3% in 1990. The share in the world
exports is bigger--2.4% in  1990--but iiot big by any stretch of imagination.  If we include
Singapore in our calculations, 1990 shares of  the ASEAN in the world GDP and exports,
respectively, rise to 1.43% and 3.87%.  These ratios are still quite small so that the possibility
that the most efficient producers are located outside the region is high.
(ii) Low Levels of Intra-Regional  Trade.  An analysis  of intra-regional  trade flows tells
us a similar story.  Tables 6 and 8, respectively, show destinations  of exports and origins of
imports of the ASEAN countries. Because  Singapore  is already a free-trading  country, exports
to that country are shown separately  from the remaining ASEAN countries.  Remarkably, the
26share of exports of Thailand going to ASEAN 4 has declined from 8.5% it  1980 to 3.9% in
1990 and that of Singapore has remained constant around 21%.  Shares of other countries,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines,  show a rising trend but their levels are small.  For three
out of four ASEAN 4 countries, the share of exports going to Singapore  has been larger than
that going to the remaining ASEAN  countries for all the three years shown in Table 5.  For the
remaining  one, Philippines,  we do not have  data for 1990  but for 1985, its exports to Singapore
at 5.3% are not much smaller than those to the ASEAN 4 (6%).
Turning to imports, the story is even more disappointing.  As shown in Table 7, the
proportion of imports of ASEAN 4 countries coming from other ASEAN 4 countries ranged
from 2.6% for Indonesia  to 4.3% for Thailand in the year 1990. The proportion has declined
over the period 1985-90 for all three countries for which data are available. Within ASEAN,
Singapore is by far the largest importer of ASEAN 4 goods.  Throughout 1980s, Singapore
purchased 16  to  17% of  its  imports from the  ASEAN 4.  Malaysia alone contributed
approx;mately 14% of Singapore's imports reflecting the special relationship  between the two
countries noted earlier.
(iii) Higher levels of Protection  in Bigger Countries  Within the ASEAN 4, Indonesia
and Thailand together accounted for approximately  70% of the region's GDP and 56% of its
imports from anywhere  in 1990. These are also the countries  which are most protected within
the  region.  Gains from discriminatory liberalization, if  any,  must come primarily from
liberalization  in these countries. But they do not plan to undertake  any liberalization  in the first
two years of the AFTA.  Therefore, the expected  impact  of the AFTA--positive  or negative--in
the first two years will be minimal.  Indeed, in the case of Indonesia, nondiscriminatory
27liberalization  through unilateral  reforms--a superior  strategy from its viewpoint--is  likely  to stay
ahead of the plans under the AFTA.
Closely related to  this point is  the issue of  distribution of  gains from preferential
liberalization  when such liberalization  is undertaken. It stands to reason that the arrangement
will benefit Malaysia  and Singapore  at the expense  of other countries. This is because  Malaysia
and Singapore have either no  or  low tariffs to  begin with.  Therefore, the potential for
discriminatory  liberalization  by them is minimal. Much of the liberalization  will have to come
from the more protected Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand.  This means that the terms of
trade for Malaysia  and Singapore  will improve. The tariff revenue collected  on goods exported
by  these countries to  Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand will disappear to  the extent of
liberalization and become a part of the former's profits on  export.  There will not be a
corresponding  gain for Indonesia,  Philippines  and Thailand on goods exported  to Singapore  and
Malaysia because the latter have relatively few high tariffs to liberalize.
These lopsided distributional  effects may well explain why the progress on preferential
liberalization  in the region has been outstripped  by unilateral, nondiscriminatory  liberalization.
For example, while Indonesia  and Philippines  have lowered trade barriers substantially  during
the 1980s as a part of their trade reform policies, they have been generally reluctant to offer
tariff preferences under the PTA.  In July 1992, Indonesia  announced  a list 250 tariff cuts but
90%  of  these were on  different types of  batik cloth produced in  Indonesia only.  The
distributional  conflict is illustrated well by a remark made by the former foreign minister of
28Indonesia, Dr. M. Kusumaatmadja,  at a meeting  in 1992 to celebrate  the 25th anniversary  of the
ASEAN: 20
"Singapore  and Malaysia are always telling us to lower tariffs and duties and let their
goods into the country.  But in return, how about the free movement  of labor? We will
take your goods if you will take our surplus  labor supply. When they hear this and think
about all those Indonesians  coming to work in their countries, then they say, 'wait a
minute, may be it's not such a good idea'."
In the past, to lengthen  their lists, member  countries  have gone so far as to include  snow  ploughs
among items to receive preferential tariffs!  There are also instances of tariff preferences on
zero-tariff goods.
Assuming net  benefits from preferential liberalization, in  principle, gainers could
compensate  the losers.  But in practice, compensation  schemes tend to be distortionary  and the
AFTA has been wise to stay away from them.  Compensation  schemes adopted by regional
arrangements in Africa proved highly distortionary. 21  In NAFTA, no compensation  has been
offered by the United States to Mexico which, on conventional  criteria, is likely to lose from
the arrangement. 22 Only the EC has been successful  in affecting large transfers to its poorer
partners as a part of the Southern Enlargement.  This has been largely due to a very strong
commitment  on the part of the original members  to unify Europe into a single market.
20Financial  Times, January 26, 1993.
21For example, see Foroutan (1993).
22The gains Mexico expects from the NAFTA are credibility  to its reform and guaranteed
access to a large market should the world divide into trading blocs. To the extent that Mexico's
tariffs are far higher than those in the United States, the NAFTA is likely to worsen its terms
of trade.  On top of that, Mexico must adopt the higher environmental  standards of the United
States and lose competitiveness.
29(iv}  A Comparison  with NAFTA.  Though  the inspiration  to turn the PTA into AFTA
has come, at least in part, from the EC and the NAFTA, it has little in common  with the latter.
Both EC and NAFTA are large markets.  Therefore, from the viewpoint of securing markets
and ensuring that the internal  sources of supply  are not much more costly than external sources,
they can be defended to some degree.  By contrast, the regional market of the AFTA is small
and comes uncomfortably  close to the markets in some of the regional associations  in Latin
America.  Member countries, though richer than those in South Asia aad Africa, are still
classified as "developing"  and the scheme has the flavor of "South-South"  rather than "South-
North" or "North-North"  arrangements. The richest country in per-capita  terms, Singapore, is
too small in absolute  terms to serve as the "center"  country  of the regional  scheme  as the United
States is expected to do in the NAFTA. The inevitable  conclusion is that an effective  regional
tradin? arrangement cannot be designed without the participation  of Japan, an issue I turn to
next.
3.2  An East Asian Trading Bloc? No.
There are two main issues which must be addressed in considering  the case for a bloc
consisting  of all major players in East Asia:  (i) Is the bloc economically  desirable; and (ii) Is
the bloc feasible? I will argue below that the answer to the first question is at besL  uncertain
while that to the second one is negative.
(iLls a Trading Bloc Economically  Desirable?  The economic desirability of an East
Asian bloc is difficult to assess.  This is because the effects of such a bloc go well beyond
simple efficiency  effects discussed  in Section 2.  As shown in Table 2, the region accounts  for
approximately one fifth of the world's GDP and exports.  Any major actions in the area of
30international  trade at the region wide level which discriminate  against the rest of the world will
lead to repercussions  in and perhaps retaliation  from the rest of the world.  Without  being able
to predict those reactions, it is difficult to estimate the costs and benefits of forming a region
wide bloc.
The paramount  objective  of East Asia's regional  trade policy has to be to ensure an open
world trading  system. Despite  some  redirection  of trade towards  itself in recent years, East Asia
ships two thirds of its exports to the rest of the world. There is little doubt that the phenomenal
growth of East Asia during the past three decades has been facilitated  greatly by relativelv  open
world markets. Almost without  exception, studies  of the NIEs draw a direct connection  between
growth i3'.  exports and that in the GDP. More recently, Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand and China
have been repeating  the experience  of the NIEs.
This suggests that the case for an East Asian bloc should  be evaluated  primarily, not on
the basis of static gains including those  arising from an improvement  in the terms of trade, but
in terms of its impact  on the world trading system. If a regional  approach is to be pursued, it
should  help keep the world markets open. There are two arguments  in favor of a discriminatory
regional bloc which deserve a close scrutiny.
First, an East Asian bloc may serve as a deterrent to the formation of closed trading
blocs around the world.  According  to this argument, the world is already dividing into blocs.
To ensure that the blocs do not become overly protective of their own markets and limit East
Asia's access to them, East Asia should be united and be in a position to retaliate.  Unilateral
actions such as those taken by the United States under its Super 301 provisions will also be
harder to take if East Asia is united.
31Second, currently, the GAWT  talks have been stalled  partly because of a large number
of participants and the free-rider problem associated  with it.  Larger countries feel that trade
concessions  negotiated  among  them become  automatically  available  to smaller  countries through
the MFN clause of the GATT.  Negotiations  with the latter are difficult  because their numbers
are large and each of them is individually too small to make such negotiations  worthwhile.
Therefore, if the world can be first divided into a small number of blocs, it will be easier to
organize future GATT negotiations.2 3 Regional  blocs could free up trade internally while the
GAIT  process, once freed from the free-rider problem, can serve to bring down the barriers
between blocs rapidly and with greater certainty.  Proponents  of the argument suggest  that one
reason why the past GATT rounds were so successful  is that the United States could deal with
the EC as a single unit.  According to this view, if East Asia is turned into a bloc and the
Americas  into another, they together  with the EC can move the world towards free trade faster.
Both of these arguments  have some merit but are highly contentious. Regarding the first
argument, critics note that countries organized into a bloc enjoy more market power than they
do individually. Therefore, in principle, there is nothing  to prevent blocs from raising rather
than lowering trade barriers.  The deterrence role of blocs is good only so long as the threat is
not carried out.  Once a threat is carried out and trade war breaks out, retaliatory actions are
likely to be larger with than without  blocs.
23The argument can be found in Summers (1991) and Krugman (1993).
32As for the second argument, critics note that small numbers do not necessarily  mean
faster progress. 24 The EC process began in  1957 and is still working towards a  'Single
Market".  In the meantime,  the EC's nontariff  barriers have proliferated: the coverage  of these
trade restrictions has expanded five fold from 1966 to 1986.
(ii) Is a Trading Bloc Feasible? Though the economic  desirability  of a trading bloc in
East Asia is difficult  to assess, its feasibility--or  lack thereof--is  more predictable. Both internal
circumstances  of the region and possible  retaliatory  actions  from outside--particularly  the United
States--make  the formation of an East Asian free trade area an unlikely  event.
Internally, there are at least three inter-related factors at work against a region wide
FTA.  First, historically, the major players in the region have been political rivals.  Though
time, trade, and intra-regional  investments  have gone a long way towards bringing the former
enemies  closer, they still do not appear ready to form a free trade area with one another. In this
respect, the situation in East Asia is fundamentally  different than in Western Europe after the
Second World War.  Then, backed by the United States, for economic as well as geopolitical
reasons, Europeans  were able to move  into treaties  establishing  first the European  Coal and Steel
Community  and later the European  Community. Today, there are no similar  pressures  on Japan.
Nor are the other economically  smaller nations such as Korea and China expressing  eagemess
to form an FTA with Japan.
Second,  the countries  in East Asia have  very different  levels of protection  and are at very
different stages of development.  This makes the distribution of gains from an FTA rather
24For example see Bhagwati  (1993)  and Winters (1993).  A summary  of the debate can be
found in Melo and Panagariya (1992).
33uneven. With discriminatory  liberalization  under an FTA, poorer countries  which  are also more
highly protected  are likely to lose or gain less than their relatively  open and richer counterparts.
This raises the specter of compensation  which, as noted in  the context of the ASEAN, is a
barrier not easily overcome.
Third, the number  of countries  in the region  is large which makes  the task of far-reaching
negotiations  required for an FTA a daunting  task.  We saw earlier how difficult it has been for
even six ASEAN countries to make progress towards the AFTA. It has taken the countries  25
years to reach the "framework agreement"  and progress on serious liberalization  is still out of
sight.  In this background, it is not clear how disparate countries such as China Japan, Korea
and the members  of ASEAN can be e, gaged in a dialogue  which will lead to a free trade area
among them.
The external factors at work against an East Asian FTA are even more formidable.
Because of perceptions that its markets are de facto closed to outsiders, Japan has been a
persistent target of market-opening  actions by the United States during the last two decades.
These actions have included voluntary  export restraints, structural impediments  initiative, and
Super 301 threats. Smaller  countries  in the region such Korea and China have also been subject
to actions under Super 301.  Initiatives by these countries for a free trade area, which can
potentially  divert trade from the United States, are almost certain to be met with retaliation  by
the latter.
From the viewpoint  of smaller nations, this external environment  is quite different from
that faced by Mexico in negotiating  the NAFTA.  Apart from the fact that, with the United
States as the other negotiating  party the threat of overt retaliation did not exist, Mexico was
34simply not very vulnerable to such actions.  In 1990, Mexico exported 71 % of its goods to
North America and only 13% to Western Europe and 6% to East Asia.  For the latter regions,
imports from Mexico amounted to approximately  a half percent of their total imports.
The situation  is dramatically  different for countries  such as China and Korea.  They not
only face an environment  which is hostiie to an FTA in East Asia but are also individually  very
vulnerable to actions against them by the United States.  In 1990, Korea sold a quarter of its
exports to the United  States. China's direct  exports were not as large but once reexports  through
Hong Kong are taken into account, it too sent a quarter of its goods to the United  States. With
such large concentration  of exports in the United  States, risks for Korea and China of an ETA
which the United States opposes are immense. This, in turn, suggests that an East Asian FTA
is not a feasible proposition in the near future.
3.3  Nondiscriminatory, Open Regionalism? Maybe.
Having argued  that sub-regional  grouping  and trading  blocs  which  promote  discriminatory
liberalization  are not worth the effort required to create and sustain them, I now come to the
"Maybe" part of the title of this paper.  I turn to the discussion  of an "open" regional  approach
centered  around  a GAIT-style, MFN-based  nondiscriminatory  liberalization.  I argue that though
this regionalism has certain advantages over discriminatory  approaches, it, too, has serious
limitations.
Before I consider the pros and cons of nondiscriminatory  liberalization,  let me take up
briefly another type of open regionalism which hzs been suggc.ted as a way to preempt the
world from turning into inward-looking  blocs. Bhagwati  (1993),  Cooper (1993),  and others have
suggested that an effective way to keep regional blocs from turning inward and ensuring thatthey eventually  lead to multilateral  free trade is to encourage  them to have  an open membership.
Any country wishing to accept the obligations  of the bloc membership  should be allowed the
privileges offered by it.  Is such a bloc in East Asia feasible  and desirable?
Without  going into the desirability  issue, let me simply  note  that the feasibility  of an open
but discriminatory  bloc is highly questionable. Internally, one must confront all the problems
noted in the previous sub-section. Externally,  it may  appear that the United s tates will be more
tolerant of a bloc which is willing to accept it as a member.  But the reality is otherwise. The
United States is not ready yet to join in a free trade area with East Asia and without  that, from
its perspective, de facto there is no difference  between an open and a closed bloc.25
This brings us to the remaining  option: nondiscriminatory  regionalism  whereby  countries
in the region will pursue a GATT type liberalization. 26 The key element distinguishing  this
approach from a regional  bloc will be nondiscriminatory  nature  of liberalization. The countries
in the region will come together  at a common  forum and, very much in the spirit of the various
GATT rounds, negotiate reductions  in trade barriers.  Any concessions  made by a country to
another will be extended automatically  to all GATT mnembers. In the following, I offer a
detailed discussion of the positive as well as negative side of this approach.
25The U.S. position that it will neither  join East Asia in an FTA nor allow the latter to form
one on its own and also pursue NAFTA is obviously  devoid of any internal logic.  But this is
the reality which East Asia cannot ignore.
26To my knowledge, a proposal to this effect has been made for the first time in a recent
World Bank (1993) report.  Petri (1992)  offers a similar proposal but makes the United States,
Australia and New Zealand a part of the overall scheme.  because intraregional  trade among
these countries and East Asia is so intense, the economic  case for this proposal can be hardly
disputed.  But the same factors which make an open trading bloc a la Bhagwati  and Cooper
politically infeasible  also cast a serious doubt on the workability  of this proposal.
363.3.1  Open Regionalism: The Positive Case
(i) No Trade Diversion.  Because tariff reductions are nondiscriminatory  under this
approach, by definition, there can be no trade diversion.  In terms of our VCR example, if
Indonesia  lowers its tariffs on Japanese VCRs in return for a tariff concession  from Japan, the
same reduction is extended to Korea and all other suppliers of VCRs.  The reduction in tariff
then benefits Indonesia's consumers  rather than Japanese VCR producers.
A lack of trade diversion takes away one major obstacle  in the way of a discriminatory
bloc:  Countries with high initial tariffs need not feel that they will lose as  a  result of
liberalization. Any gains from liberalization  will accrue to consumers  inside the country rather
than the partner country.  Problems mentioned  earlier regarding compensation  will simply  not
arise.
(ii) Extemal Constraints.  This  regionalism will certainly face a much less seriou  s
challenge from  the United States.  Because the liberalization is nondiscriminatory,  it will
improve the U.S. access to East Asia's markets as well.  Indeed, the negotiations  could go a
long way towards answering the U.S. complaints  about a lack of openness  of markets in East
Asia in general, and io.an and China, in particular.
More importantly, liberalization at the regional level may help alleviate two major
problems which provide ammunition  to the advocates of unilateral trade-policy  actions in the
United States against Japan and  other  trading partners.  First,  to  the  extent that  such
liberalization  is likely to shift the region's exports away from the United  States  and towards East
Asia, some of the current competitive  pressure on the U.S. industry may be relieved.  At the
least, a decline in Japan's share in the U.S. market and possibly a rise in the share of domestic
37producers there will weaken the  lobbies' case for trade-policy actions against the former.
Second,  the possible  shift in exports towards East Asia may  alleviate trade deficits of the United
States with Japan and China. Because  the overall trade deficit is a macroeconomic  phenomenon
governed by investment-savings  gap, this redirection may not help the 1Q  U.S. trade deficit.
But it may help lower bilateml  trade deficit. If so, nondiscriminatory  liberalization  will weaken
considemably  the case for unilateral  actions by the United States.
(iii) Low Adjustment  Costs.  Because  liberalization  will take place simultaneously  in all
the major countries of the region, this approach will help minimize  the costs of adjustment. In
the GATr  style, liberalization  will be in areas of mutual interest.  Therefore, countries will
improve export prospects at the same time that they subject their import competing industries
to competition  from abroad. In contrast, if liberalizatiun  is unilateral  or, worse still, in response
to Super 301 type of threats from the United States, adjustment  costs will be higher.  In the
spirit of the GATT, it may also be possible to allow the liberalization  process to be spread over
a period of, say, 10 years.  This will further smoothen  the path of adjustment.
(iv_ East Asia's Role in World Economic Affairs.  In recent decades the United States
has become what Jagdish Bhagwati calls a Diminished Giant.  Simultaneously, East Asia,
particularly Japan, has emerged  as the major economic  power in the world.  While other parts
of the w.rld  have suffered from severe recession, this region has grown at healthy rates.
Gradually, commensurate  with their current economic  weight  and future potential,  Japan
and the Greater China region (including  China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) must assume the
leadership role in the world economic affairs.  Japan has already emerged as a major donor
country  in the world. Within  East Asia, it now enjoys the same  central role as the United  States
38in the Americas  and Germany  in the EC.  It provided  more than  half of the official  development
assistance commitments  to East Asia in 1992 against only 6% from the United States.  More
than 30% of the region's net direct foreign investment  in 1990  came from Japan compared  with
10% from the United States.  Parallel with these developments  in Japan, China is rapidly
becoming  a major engine of growth in Asia. According  to a recent World Bank  report, Greater
China has become the world's 'fourth growth pole' after Europe, North America and Japan.
The report notes that imports into Greater China region are already two-thirds  as much as Japan
and will surpass the latter by the year 2002 if growth continues  at the present rate. 27 Import
liberalization  by China in the years to come will further enhance that country's role in global
economic  affairs. Region  wide liberalization  could then serve  as a stepping  stone to the eventual
leadership role for East Asia in general and Japan and China in particular.
(v? Market Driven Integration. Nondiscriminatory  liberalization  in the region may also
reinforce the market driven integration  which  has been taking  place in the region during the past
decade.  For example, liberalization in China is sure to reinforce the trade and investment
relationships  in Greater South  China. Likewise,  liberalization  in Indonesia  may  help the growth
process in the SUORI region.  To the extent that this liberalization  will reiterate loudly East
Asia's commitment  to outward orientationt,  direct foreign investment  will flow into the region
in increased volume.
3.3.2  Open Regionalism: The Negative  Case
The discussion up to this point makes nondiscriminatory  liberalization  almost too good
to be true.  And it is.  Though,  as just described, there is much to be gained from this type of
27See the article by Laurence  Zuckerman in the Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1993.
39liberalization  in the long run, the short tp medium  run economic  effects are not favorable. This
means that it will be difficult to mobilize  support for implementation  of the scheme.  Let me
elaborate.
As shown in Table 11, the existing  levels of tariffs, at least in Japan, are relatively  low.
This means that potential  gains from lowering this most transparent  barrier to trade in Japan  are
limited.  Indeed matters are worse than Table 11 reveals.  Japan gives very extensive trade
preferences under the GSP to its East Asian trading partners.  For example, in  the case of
Korea, 88% of the Japanese tariff lines facing it are either zero or below the MFN level.  For
approximately  two thirds of the tariff lines, the GSP gives  Korea a duty free access.  A similar
pattern  applies to  other  countries. 28 This  means that if  Japan lowers  its  tariffs  in  a
nondiscriminatory  fashion, developing  East Asian countries  will lose the tariff preferences  they
currently enjoy.  This is most likely to be a losi.g proposition  for them.
There does not appear to be a substantial  scope for gains from a reduction in tariffs in
other countries either.  Because tariff levels across countries  are highly variable, the scope for
quid pro quo is limited.  Thailand, Indonesia and arguably China have the highest levels of
tariffs.  At the other extreme, Singapore  and Hong Kong have virtually no tariffs while Japan
imposes  very low tariffs on its East Asian partners.  In-between  we have Korea and Philippines
with tariffs generally  below 20%.  Given this cross-country  structure of tariffs, it will be rathei-
difficult to engineer an MFN style liberalization.
28Singapore  pays a positive MFN tariff in only 8% of the cases.  At 15%, among the
ASEAN countries, Indonesia  has the largest share of tariff lines with positive MFN rates.
40The picture with respect to nontariff barriers is similar.  Identifiable nontariff barriers
are limited.  We do not have information  on all countries  but in the cases where it is available,
these barriers are  not extensive.  Japan employs few formal nontariff barriers.  Among the
countries shown in Table 4, Indonesia has the highest level of nontariff barriers.  But even in
this case, only 16% of the country's import items are subject to such barriers.  In terms of
formal barriers, perhaps China is most protective.  But in reality, China's imports have risen
sharply in recent years suggesting that its import regime is freer than may be suggested by
formal restrictions.
This discussion  leads to the conclusion  that the only significant  trade liberalization  in the
region may come from lowering the so-called "informal"  barriers to trade that Japan is often
alleged to have.  In order to bring to the negotiating  table the countries with high formal trade
barriers, only Japan can make attractive  concessions. But the problem with "informal"  barriers
is that either they may not exist or they are invisible. It is simply  not clear how countries can
negotiates  on these barriers.
It is possible that purely on the basis of inter-temporal  balance of trade, Japan's imports
in the coming years will rise faster than its exports. 29 Then it may be argued that Japan can
use this opportunity  to aggressively  lead other East Asian countries towards liberalization. But
once again, it is difficult to imagine  other countries  participating  in a negotiation  when import
expansion in Japan is expected to happen through market forces in any case and there are no
formal offers on the table for a reduction in trade barriers.
29The argument here is that Japan will not keep accumulating  dollars for ever.  It must
spend them some time.
41A final and important point is that even if we can somehow identify substantial  trade
barriers in Japan and other countries  which  can be negotiated  away  on a nondiscriminatory  basis,
the likely decline in the terms of trade of the region could be substantia!. This is because two
thirds of the region's exports are  sold to extra-regional markets.  Therefore, the free-rider
problem which the negotiating  parties at the GATT were able to avoid will be unavoidable  for
East Asia.  As Finger (1979) has shown, an extremely large proportion of the total trade in
goods which were liberalized by the United States, EC and Japan under the GATT agreements
was among these very  countries.  Therefore, the free rider problem associated with the
liberalization  was minimal.  This is unlikely  to be the case for East Asia.
4.  Conclusions
On the whole, this paper takes a pessimistic view of regionalism  in East Asia.  The
pessimism follows, inter alia, from low or negative gains in the case of sub-regional  groupings
such as the AFTA, insurmountable  external and internal barriers to effective  integration  in the
case of an Asia wide discriminatory  bloc, and adverse terms of trade effects in the case of
nondiscriminatory  regionalism. In the ultimate,  if regionalism  is to be pursued, it is perhaps the
last option which holds most promise.  This option has the limitation  that it may not offer large
opportunities  for liberalization  and, if it does, the terms of trade effects on East Asia will be
adverse.  Yet, it has the advantage  of promoting  a more liberal and open world trading system.
The long run gains from this openness  far outweigh  the short term losses arising from adverse
terms of trade effects.
42It bears repeating that the case against a discriminatory  regional approach in East Asia
is not based so much on its direct economic  impact--either  favorable or unfavorable--as  on its
infeasibility in the current environment. With many of the countries in the region selling an
extremely high proportion of their exports to the United  States, the ability of the latter to subvert
a trading bloc in the region through both carrot and stick is beyond doubt.  On the one hand,
the United States can offer an FTA to countries such as Korea and Singapore in return for
staying  out of an East Asian bloc while on the other it can threaten them with retaliation  if they
go ahead with such a bloc.30
This reality combined with the persistent trade deficits of the U.S. economy  suggest  that
the best strategy for Japan and its East Asian trading partners today is to assume the same
leadership role in the world economic  affairs that England played in the 19th century and the
United States did in the post-Second-World-War  era.  This means that, on the one hand, Japan
should express its strong support for Uruguay Round and take a leadership role in pushing
aggressively for continued openness in the world trading system beyond the Uruguay Round.
It is likely that the emphasis on savings placed in Japan after the Second World War, which
eventually led  to  the build up  of  huge trade surpluses, will now give way to increased
expenditures  and hence larger imports.  A similar phenomenon  is likely to play out in China.
Taking advantage  of this opportunity,  Japan and China could take the high ground and lead East
Asia and ultimately the world into a round of further trade liberalization.
30This is not to suggest that circumstances  could not change ten years from now.  For
instance, ten years ago, it was difficult to imagine an FTA between the United States and
Mexico but today it is more or less a reality.
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45TABLE  1
REAL  AVERAGE  ANNUAL  RATES  OF  GROWTH  (%)
ODP  EXPORTS  IMPORTS
YEAR  13070  197040 '19040  100.70  197040 130900  190.i  197040  130040
INDONESIA  3.9  7.6  5.5  4.0  8.7  2.8  2.0  11.9  1.4
MALAYSIA  6.5  7.8  5.2  5.8  7.4  10.3  2.3  7.0  5.6
PHIUPPINES  5.1  6.3  0.9  2.2  7.0  2.5  7.1  3.4  2.3
THAILAND  8.4  7.2  7.6  5.2  11.8  13.2  11.2  5.4  10.2
SINGAPORE  8.8  8.5  6.4  4.2  12.0  8.6  5.9  9.9  6.7
HONGKONG  10.0  9.3  7.1  12.7  9.4  6.2  9.2  11.7  11.0
KOREA  8.6  9.5  9.7  34.1  23.0  12.8  20.5  11.8  10.8
TAIWAN(CHINA)  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  18.9*  12.1  N.A.  15.1*  10.1
JAPAN  10.9  5.0  4.1  17.2  8.9  4.2  13.7  4.4  5.6
CHINA  5.2  5.8  9.5  N.A.  4.8*  11.0  N.A.  7.4*  9.8
INDUSTRIAL  MARKET  ECOS  5.2  3.2  3.1  10.9  -0.6  4.3  10.9  22.3  %5.3
USA  4.3  3.0  3.4  6.0  6.9  3.3  9.8  4.8  7.6
GERMANY  4.4  2.6  2.1  10.1  5.8  4.2  10.0  5.9  3.9
MIDDLE  INCOME  ECOS  5.9  5.6  3.2  5.4  3.9  3.8  6.4  4.2  0.9
NDIA  3.4  3.6  5.3  3.0  3.7  6.5  -0.9  2.8  4.2
BRAZIL  5.4  8.4  2.7  5.1  7.5  4.0  4.9  4.2  -0.3
MEXICO  7.2  5.2  1.0  2.8  13.4  3.4  6.4  7.0  -1.1
*JData  for the period 1965.80.
FROM  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  REPORTS  (1982,1987,1992)
'SOURCES:  U.N.  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  (GDP)  AND
.N.  COMTRADE  DATA  SUPPLEMENTED  BY  WORLD  BANK  ESTIMATES  (EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS).)TABLE  2
EAST  ASIA: ECONOMIC  INDICATORS
GNP  SHARE  IN  SHARE  IN  SHARE  IN SHARE  IN  EXPORT  IMPORT
PER  WORLD  WORLD  WORLD  WORLD  TO  GDP  TO  GDP
YEAR  CAPITA  GDP  POPULATIO  EXPORTS  IMPORTS  RATIO  RATIO
(0)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
ASEAN  4  1980  853  1.48  5.46  2.27  1.85  28  23
1985  978  1.49  5.57  2.33  1.83  25  20
1990  1260  1.27  5.62  2.40  2.64  31  35
INDONESIA  1980  430  0.69  3.15  1.06  0.51  28  14
1985  530  0.70  3.18  0.95  0.50  21  12
1990  570  0.49  3.20  0.72  0.59  24  20
MALAYSIA  1980  1620  0.22  0.29  0.63  0.51  53  44
1985  2000  0.25  0.31  0.79  0.60  49  39
1990  2320  0.20  0.32  0.82  0.79  69  69
PHILIPPINES  1980  690  0.29  1.03  0.28  0.39  18  26
1985  580  0.25  1.07  0.23  0.27  15  18
1990  730  0.20  1.10  0.22  0.35  18  30
THAILAND  1980  670  0.28  0.99  0.31  0.44  20  29
1985  800  0.30  1.01  0.36  0.45  19  25
1990  1420  0.38  1.00  0.64  0.90  28  41
NIEs  1980  3135  1.27  1.34  2.73  3.25  40  48
1985  4761  1.65  1.33  4.24  4.27  40  42
i 990  8945  2.34  1.29  5.57  5.77  39  42
SINGAPORE  1980  4430  0.10  0.05  0.93  1.13  165  205
1985  7420  0.14  0.05  1.16  1.29  129  149
1990  11160  0.16  0.05  1.47  1.65  150  173
:ONG  KONG  1980  4240  0.24  0.11  0.95  1.06  72  82
1985  6230  0.27  0.11  1.54  1.46  90  89
1990  11490  0.33  0.10  2.29  2.23  115  116TABLE  2 (caL
EAST  ASIA:  ECONOMIC  INOICATORS
GNP  SHARE IN  SHARE IN  SHARE IN  SHARE IN  EXPORT  IMPORT
PER  WORLD  WORLD  WORLD  WORLD  TO GDP  TO GDP
YEAR  CAPITA  GDP  POPULATIO EXPORTS  IMPORTS  RATIO  RATIO
l%}  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
KOREA  1980  1520  0.55  0.81  0.84  1.05  28  36
1985  2150  0.74  0.80  1.54  1.53  33  34
1990  5400  1.12  0.77  1.81  1.89  27  29
TAIWAN  1980  2348  0.37  0.37  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
1985  3244  0.50  0.37  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
1990  7729  0.72  0.36  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
CHINA  1980  290  2.64  20.84  0.87  0.96  6  7
1985  310  2.33  20.52  1.40  2.10  9  15
1990  370  1.71  20.34  1.71  1.42  17  14
JAPAN  1980  9890  9.37  2.48  6.29  6.68  12  13
1985  11300  10.73  2.36  9.02  6.40  13  10
1990  25430  13.54  2.22  8.02  6.37  10  8
EAST  ASIA  1980  2613  14.75  30.12  13.13  13.65  16  17
1985  3456  16.20  29.78  18.33  15.67  18  16
1990  6662  18.86  29.47  19.10  17.37  17  16
EAST ASIA  1980  1804  5.38  27.64  6.84  6.97  23  24
(excl. JAPAN)  1985  2585  5.46  27.42  9.31  9.27  27  28
1990  4577  5.31  27.26  11.08  11.01  34  35
CURCES:  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  REPORT,
U.N. SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  AND
IFS TRADE  STATISTICSIABLE-3
DIRECTION  OF EXPORTS
P-SRTNEI
EXPORTER  YEAR  NORTH WESTERN  EUROPE  EAST  LATIN  AFRICA  MIDDLE  SOUTH
AMERICA  EUROPE  ASIA  (^)  AMERICA  EAST  ASIA
NORTH  AMERIC  1980  33.5  25.2  27.4  15.8  8.9  3.3  4.2  1.0
1985  44.4  19.3  21.0  15.5  5.9  2.5  3.2  1.0
1990  41.9  22.3  23.4  20.4  5.0  1.7  2.6  0.8
WESTERN  ELiRO  1980  6.7  67.1  71.9  2.9  2.4  7.2  5.5  0.7
1985  11.3  64.9  68.9  3.6  1.6  5.2  5.0  0.9
1990  8.3  71.0  74.4  5.3  1.1  3.3  3.3  0.7
EUROPE  1980  6.3  63.7  72.7  2.7  2.3  6.9  5.5  0.7
1985  11.0  63.5  69.2  3.4  1.6  5.1  5.0  0.9
1990  8.2  70.6  74.5  5.2  1.1  3.3  3.3  0.7
EASTASIA  1980  26.0  16.8  18.9  29.9  4.1  4.4  7.4  1.8
1985  37.8  13.6  15.5  25.3  2.8  2.2  5.1  2.0
1990  31.9  19.8  20.7  32.3  1.9  1.6  3.0  1.5
LATIN  AMERICA  1980  27.9  26.5  35.1  5.4  16.6  2.7  1.9  0.5
1985  35.8  25.9  30.4  7.1  12.1  3.7  3.0  0.7
1990  22.9  25.3  27.6  10.3  14.0  2.1  2.4  0.4
AFRICA  1980  27.4  43.6  46.1  4.3  3.2  1.8  1.7  0.3
1985  14.8  64.9  69.3  1.8  4.2  5.1  2.2  0.7
1990  3.0  66.0  68.0  4.6  0.6  12.8  4.4  3.6
MIDDLE  EAST  1980  11.5  40.3  41.5  28.7  5.0  1.5  4.1  2.5
1985  6.2  15.0  17.7  1.5  0.3  1.4  8.7  0.4
1990  17.8  48.6  53.0  9.1  1.2  3.6  8.5  0.9
SOUTHASIA  1980  10.9  24.6  39.4  14.5  0.5  6.8  14.5  5.6
1985  18.4  20.8  37.0  16.4  0.4  4.6  11.0  4.4
1990  17.1  30.1  46.6  18.3  0.3  2.7  6.5  3.2
() East Asia  does not include  China.
SOURCE:  U.N. COMTRADE  DATA&IiLL4
TRADE  PROTECTION  IN EAST  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC:  SELECTED  ECONOMIES
Avoe  NomInal Taritff  Peent  of Import  It  Effectivo  Protection  Rate
(Unweighted)  Subject to  Import Restricllons  In Manumaotarng
Early 10S  Current  Early 1980e  Currnt  Current
KOREA  25.0 (180)  13.0  (198)  31.4 (190)  4.6 (19O8)  28.2 (1982)
INDONESIA  37.0 (1962)  22.0 (1991)  31.5 (1966)  10.3 (190)  59.0 (1900)
MALAYSIA  11.6(190)  13.6(1985)  cs  (190)  ucS (196)  23.0(1982)
PHILIPPINES  43.1 (1960)  27.9 (1901)  37.0 (1980)  8.0 (1990)  20.0 (1964)
THAILAND  31.0 (191)  34.0 (1965)  < 5  (1981)  < 5  (1991)  51.2 (1968)
NOTE:  Eff.a'e  Protefton Rfh  (EPR)  for Thadlnd  excluda agro-poc"ssing  and  uus"  valuedded  at world
prces  as  weIghht. Using the mor  atdord  weightng of volue4ddsd a  domosti  prices  yields an EPP
of 00.7  In lose.
SOURCE:  WORLD  BANK  COUNTRY  REPORTS  AND  STAFF  ESTIMATES.TABLE 5
DIRECTION OF EXPORTS: NIEs, CHINA AND JAPAN
(as prcontage of total  exports  to the world)
PARTNER
E)XPORTER  YEAR TOTAL  EXPORT  NIEs  ASEAN  4  CHINA  JAPAN  EAST  E.  C.  NORTH  OTHER
(In billion 6)  ('1  ASIA  AMERICA
NIE5  1980  9.0  8.9  0.9  10.3  29.1  17.2  28.3  25.3
1985  8.5  7.0  2.3  10.7  28.5  11.4  40.7  19.5
1990  13.0  9.3  3.2  12.7  38.2  15.5  31.1  15.2
1990  249.8  12.5  8.9  8.4  11.5  41.4  14.7  27.1  16.7
1991  *  279.7  13.8  9.2  9.9  10.2  43.2  14.7  24.1  18.0
HONG KONG  1980  4.2  2.8  2.4  3.4  12.8  29.5  36.0  21.7
1985  3.0  2.0  11.7  3.4  20.1  18.4  47.9  13.5
1990  6.8  3.2  24 0  5.3  36.3  20.4  32.1  11.2
1990  *  65.5  12.2  5.0  31.0  3.3  51.5  14.8  17.5  16.2
1991  76.0  11.5  4.4  35  2.7  53.8  13.8  15.1  17.3
KOREA  1980  7.4  4.9  0.0(4.7)  17.3  29.6  15.8  28.6  26.2
1955  7.4  3.4  0.0(5.2)  15.0  25.8  10.7  39.8  23.7
1990  10.4  5.0  0.0(5.8)  19.4  34.8  13.7  33.5  18.1
1990  *  65.0  7.6  5.1  0.0(2.9)  21.1  33.8  13.8  32.6  20.0
1991  *  68.3  a.9  6.2  0.4(3.1)  17.9  33.0  14.5  28.9  23.6
SINGAPORE  1980  10.9  20.8  1.6  8.1  41.3  12.8  13.6  32.3
1985  9.3  20.6  1.5  9.4  40.7  10.6  22.0  26.7
1990  13.6  20.9  1.5  8.7  44.8  14.4  22.3  18.5
1990  *  52.8  12.3  20.9  1.5  8.8  43.5  14.4  22.1  20.0
1991  *  59.2  13.1  22.4  1.5  8.7  45.7  14.0  20.5  19.8
TAIWAN (CHINA)  1980  12.0  5.1  (7.9)  11.0  28.1  14.8  37.0  20.3
1985  12.0  3.1  (8.3)  11.3  26.4  8.8  51.6  13.1
1990  17.8  e.8  (12.8)  12.4  37.1  16.0  35.3:  11.7
1990  e  66.5  17.9  6.9  (12.8)  12.5  37.3  16.1  35.1  11.5
1991  76.2  21.2  6.5  (16.3)  12.1  39.8  I6.3  31.5  12.4
CHINA  1980  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
1ts4  31.5  3.0  (26.5)  20.6  55.1  9.0  10.3  25.6
1990  48,6  2.8  (42.9)  14.5  65.9  9.1  9.2  15.8
1990  64.5  14.6  3.3  (o0.8)  18.7  36.6  19.1  26.0  18.3
1991  72.0  11.3  3.0  (5.5)  19.8  34.1  23.5  29.0  13.4
JAPAN  1980  14.8  7.0  3.9  0.0  25.7  13.9  27.3  33.1
1985  12.3  4.2  7.1  0.0  24.1  12.0  40.7  23.3
1090  19.7  7.7  2.1  0.0  29.6  16.8  34.8  16.8
1990  *  287.7  19.8  7.8  2.1  0.0  29.7  18.8  34.0  17.5
1991  *  314.9  21.3  5.1  2.7  0.0  29.1  18.9  31.6  20.4
*) Figures in parenthesis are exports to Hong Kong
Direction of  Trade  dea  adjusted for exports of China through Hong Kong
SOURCE:  U.N. COMTRADE  DATA
IMF 'DIRECTION  OF TRADE  DATATABLE 6
DIRECTION OF EXPORTS: ASEAN 5
(as percentage of total exports  to tho world)
PARTNER
EXPORTER  YEAR  TOTAL EXPORT  ASEAN 4  NIEs *xcl,  SINGAPOR  JAPAN  EAST  E. C.  NORTH  OTHER
(in billion  S)  SINGAPOR  (-W)  ASIA  AMERICA
ASEAN 4  1960  3.2  5.3  1  1.  34.6  55.6  13.6  19.2  11.5
198  4.5  8.1  11.9  30.8  56.7  12.0  20.6  10.7
1990  @  41  9.7  12.2  24.7  52.8  16.0  20.1  11.1
1991  *  100.6  4.0  10.1  12.9  23.0  52.3  16.1  19.4  12.2
INDONESIA  1980  1.3  3.7  11.3  49.3  65.5  6.s  19.8  8.1
1965  1.9  7.3  8.7  46.2  84.7  6.2  22.J  7.1
1990  2.4  10.9  7.1  42.7  86.4  11.9  13.9  7.9
1991  *  29.1  2.7  12.7  8.3  37.0  64.8  12.8  12.6  9.8
MALAYSIA  1980  3.2  5.7  19.1  22.8  52.5  17.6  16.9  13.0
198  6.3  9.6  19.5  23.8  60.2  14.8  13.7  11.5
1990  6.0  10.0  22.8  1s.8  36.6  '4.9  17.9  10.5
1991  *  34.4  5.8  10.4  23.3  15.9  57.1  14.8  17.7  10.4
PHILIPPINES  1980  4.6  8.5  1.9  26.5  42.2  17.6  29.1  112
1985  6.0  7.5  5.3  19.0  39.5  15.8  37.5  7.2
1988  3.7  9.9  2.9  20.3  37.7  17.7  37.4  7.1
1991  8  s.8  4.3  9.4  2.6  20.0  37.7  18.6  37.3  6.4
THAILAND  1980  8.5  7.1  7.4  15.3  40.1  26.4  13.2  20.2
1985  6.4  7.5  7.7  13.4  38.8  19.2  21.1  20.9
iS90  3.9  7.8  7.3  17.2  373  21.6  24.5  16.6
1991  *  28.3  3.2  7.3  8.3  18.2  38.2  20.3  22.9  18.6
SINGAPORE  1980  20.8  10.9  15 .0)  8.1  41.3  12.8  13.6  s  32.3
1964  20.6  9.3  (15.5)  9.4  40.7  10.6  22.0  26.7
1990  20.9  13.6  (13.0)  8.7  448  14  4  22.3  18.5
1991  '  59.2  22.4  13.1  (14.9)  8.7  45.7  14.0  20.5  19 8
(*)  Figuros in parenthesis are exports of Singapore to Malaysia
@  Figures for Philippines used to calculate 1990 ASEAN  4 shares correspond to 1988
Direction of Trade data ad/usted for exports of China tnrough Hong Kong
SOURCE.  U.N. COMTRADE  DATA
* IMF DIRECTION  OF TRADE  DATATAIBLE  7
DIRECTION OF IMPORTS  NIEs, CHINA AND JAPAN
(mu  p,9o  ag4  of total ImpoQt from the wod)
COUNTRY OF ORIIIN
IMPORTER  YEAR  TOTAL IMPORT  NIEs  ASEAN 4  CHINA  JAPAN  EAST  E. C.  NORTH  OTHER
(In billion  8)  ("  ASIA  AMERICA
NIEs  1960  e.9  8.2  5.7  23.4  44.2  9.8  18.9  27.1
198l  8.3  8.1  9.2  22.7  48.3  10.7  10.2  22.8
logw  1¶0  7.4  12.2  22.6  52.8  11.7  18.6  16.9
1990  *  246.9  11.2  7.8  3.6  24.3  47.0  13.8  19.6  19.7
1991  *  282.9  11.8  8.6  2.2  25.1  47.7  13.3  19.4  1s9.
HONG  KONG  1980  15.8  3.9  20.0  23.3  63.0  12.5  12.8  11.7
1985  17.5  2.8  25.5  23.1  88.8  11.6  0.9  97
1990  17.5  3.8  36.8  l16.  74.0  9.8  8.6  7.7
1990  *  62.3  23.2  3.8  11.1  21.3  59.4  12.9  11.2  16.5
1991  *  72.1  25.1  6.1  5.5  22.7  58.4  12.8  11.1  17.7
KOREA  1980  2.b  5.9  (0.4)  26.2  34.7  7.3  23.9  34.1
1985  3.5  7.1  (1.6)  24.2  34.8  9.8  23.3  32.1
1990  4.3  5.6  (0.9)  '  26.7  36.6  12.1  26.8  24.5
1990  *  69.8  4.0  5.8  (1.2)  26.4  36.2  15.5  25.5  22.8
1991  *  81.2  4.3  5.8  (0.9)  26.4  36.5  15.5  25.5  22.5
SINGAPORE  1980  5.6  10.2  2.6  17.8  42.2  11.0  14.7  32.1
1985  6.8  17.2  8.6  17.0  49.6  11.3  15.6  23.5
1990  10.7  16.9  3.4  20.1  51.2  12.9  16.7  19.3
1990  e  61.0  10.2  16.7  3.4  20.1  50.4  12.8  16.7  20.1
1991  *  6.3  10.0  18.9  3.4  21.3  53.6  12.0  16.5  17.9
TAIWAN  (CHINA)  190o  3.4  5.9  (1.3)  27.2  36.5  8.2  25.2  30.2
1985  3.9  5.7  (1.6)  27.5  37.2  10.2  25.9  >  26.7
1990  8.1  4.9  (2.3)  30.0  42.9  13.0  25.4,  18.6
1990  *  53.8  7.8  4.8  (2.7)  30.0  42.6  13.6  25.0  16.8
1991  *  63.3  8.2  5.5  (3.1)  30.0  43.7  12.3  24.1  19.9
CHINA  1980  NA.  NA.  NA.  NA.  NA.  NA.  NA.  NA.
1964  11,5  2.6  (10,9)  31.3  45.4  12.7  19.1  22.8
1990  33.6  3.9  (26.5)  14.2  51.8  15.0  15.2  18.0
1990  '  54.4  32.5  4.1  (26.7)  14.1  51.0  15.3  14 8  16.9
1991  *  64.0  36.4  4.4  (27.3)  15.8  56.6  13.3  15.1  15.0
JAPAN  1980  5.3  14.1  3.1  0.0  22.4  5.8  21.5  50.3
1985  7.7  13.1  5.1  0.0  25.9  6.9  25.5  41.7
1990  11.2  10.5  5.2  0.0  26.9  15.0  27.1  31.1
1990  *  235.3  11.0  10.4  5.1  0.0  26.5  15.0  26.1  32.4
1991  *  23e6.  11.5  11.3  6.0  0.0  22.8  13.5  25.9  37.8
(F)  figures  in parenthesis are imports from Hong Kong
*  Direction of Trade data ad/lusted for imports of China througn Hong Kong
SOURCE:  U.N. COMTRALE DATA
'IMF  DIRECTION  OF TRADE  DATATABLE 8
DIRECTION OF IMPORTS: ASEAN S
(as poroentag.  of total  Imports  from  the world)
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
IMPORTER  YEAR  TOTAL IMPORT  ASEAN 4  NIEe cxcl.  SINGAPOR  JAPAN  EAST  E. C.  NORTH  OTHER
(In bililon  5)  SINGAPOR  ()  ASIA  AMERICA
ASEAN 4  1980  4.0  6.1  7.4  24.1  44.5  13.4  17.8  24.3
1968  6.0  6.8  9.7  23.4  48.7  14.4  17.6  19.3
1990  @  3.9  10.9  8.9  26.2  52.7  14.9  15.4  16.9
1991  *  112.2  3.9  11.0  9.7  26.3  50.9  14.5  14.9  19.7
INDONESIA  1980  3.8  7.4  8.6  31.5  53.2  13.6  14.0  19.2
1985  1.2  5.3  8.2  25.6  42.9  17.6  18.8  20.7
1990  2.6  11.9  5.8  24.3  47.6  18.6  13.7  20.1
1991  *  25.9  3.0  11.6  6.6  24.5  45.7  15.2  14.3  21.8
MALAYSIA  1980  4.7  5.5  11.7  23.0  47.2  15.7  18.1  21.0
1985  6.6  6.6  15.8  23.2  54.2  14.1  16.4  15.2
1990  4.2  10.4  14.6  25.3  5a.5  13.2  18.5  11.7
1991  36.7  4.2  10.3  15.5  26.1  56.1  13.6  16.1  14.2
PHILIPPINES  1980  4.5  6.5  1.6  19.9  35.1  10.7  24.7  29.5
1985  11.5  11.1  2.6  14.4  45.0  8.5  26.0  20.5
1988  4.7  14.5  4.0  17.4  43.7  12.6  22.3  21.3
1991  12.9  5.3  16.2  3.7  19.4  44,6  10.2  21.5  23.7
THAILAND  1980  3.1  5.1  6.3  20.7  39.5  13.0  18.2  29.3
1965  7.2  6.3  7.5  26.5  49.9  14.8  12.9  22.4
1990  4.3  9.6  7.5  30.6  55.3  14,5  12.2  18.0
1991  36.7  3.8  9.6  a.2  30.1  51.7  14.3  11.8  22.2
SINGAPORE  1980  16.2  5.6  (13.9)  17.8  42.2  11.0  14.7  32.1
1984  17.2  8.8  (14.4)  17.0  49.6  11.3  15.6  23.5
1990  16.9  10.7  (13.7)  20.1  51 2  12.9  16.7  19.3
1991  *  66.3  18.9  10.0  (15.3)  21.3  50.2  12.0  16.7  21.1
(*)  Figur6s in parenthesis  are imports  of Singapore  from Malaysia
@ Figure: for Philippines  used  to caiculate  1990  ASEAN  4 shares  correspond  to 1988
Direction  of Trade  data  adjusted  for imports  of China  through  Hong  Kong
SOURCE:  U.N.  COMTRADE  C  ATA
* IMF  DIRECTION  OF TRADE  DATATABLE  9
UTILIZATION  OF PREFERENTIAL  TRADING  ARRANGEMENTS  IN 1987
Country  No. of  No. of  Imports  Total Imp.  Share of  Share of
Items  Items In  Granted  from ASEAN  No. of  Value of
Granted PTA  PTA List  PTA  of PTA  Items  Items
Granted Items
USS('OOO)  USS('OOO)  (%)  (%)
INDONESIA  45  2,754  15,258  50,426  1.6  30.3
MALAYSIA  86  2,267  28,868  131,286  3.8  22.0
PHILIPPINES  na  3,443  na  na  na  na
SINGAPORE  114  2,465  35,970  293,608  4.6  12.3
THAILAND  95  1,854  21,352  58,366  5.1  36.9
TOTAL  337  12,783  101,628  239,214  2.6  42.5
SOURCE:  COMMITTEE  ON TRADE  AND  TOURISM  (COTT),ASEAN  SECRETARIATTABLE  10
UTILIZATION  OF PTA BY INDONESIA
1987-89
1987  1986  1989
Exports  by Indonesia
1. World*  17,136  19,219  22,159
2.  ASEAN*  1,704  2,079  2,429
(%  Share  2/1)  9.9  10.8  11.0
3. Total PTA*  25  57  84
(% Share  3/2)  1.4  2.8  3.5
Imports  by Indonesia
1. World*  12,370  13,248  16,360
2. ASEAN*  1,244  1,305  1,766
(%  Share  2/1)  10.1  9.9  10.8
3. Total PTA*  15  27  28
(%  Share  3/2)  1.2  2.1  1.6
* VALUES  EXPRESSED  IN MILLIONS  OF  DOLLARS.
SOURCE:  CENTRAL  BUREAU  OF  STATISTICS  AND  MINISTRY
TRADETable 11
Market
Exzofler  Australia  Canada  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  New Zealand  Philippines  Thailand  USA
Australia  X  6.9  8  5.5  17.9  2.7  18.2  16.7  20.2
Canada  7.7  X  4.1  3  8.9  2.6  9.5  14.1  20.2
China  32.3  14.8  11.5  4.1  NA  9.1  18.3  19.9  29.5
Hong Kong  21  15.2  25.1  2.2  14.3  12.5  15.9  33  46.8
Indonesia  8.4  7.9  X  3.2  9.6  7.3  7.1  14 3  33.5  5.1
Japan  21.2  7.3  14.2  X  18.6  11.7  19.2  22.8  45.3  3.5
Korea  25  13  16.1  4  X  10.6  18.8  25  38.4  7.5
Malaysia  8  7.1  8.7  0.9  6.8  X  12.7  13.5  27.8  2.6
NewZealand  12.3  10.2  7.7  6.3  11.4  3.6  X  18.4  27.4  2.3
P!uUiIppines  17.3  11.2  2.6  4.1  16.8  3.7  13.4  X  39.8  6.2
Singapore  7  5.2  9.7  3.4  15  10.1  13.1  21.5  38  3.6
Taiwan  19.5  12.4  16.1  3.5  18.9  12  20.2  30.2  42.4  7.3
Thailand  16.8  10.1  7.5  11.2  62.3  6.1  15.9  22.9  X  3.9
USA  9.4  7.1  10.5  5.8  12.6  5.4  9.8  20.6  29.4contact
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